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The transition of a small number of developing countries to high living standards over 
the last four decades has brought to the fore debates on the content and conditions of 
the capitalist transformation. What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
sustained and rapid improvements in living standards that have historically been 
achieved in countries going through successful capitalist transformations? The 
capitalist late developers were different in many respects from the early developers, 
but they are recognizably capitalist given the important role of private sector 
capitalists in these transitions. But in late developers, states played a bigger role in 
ensuring and maintaining high rates of investment and the shift to higher productivity 
technologies.  
 
Beyond these very general observations, there is little agreement about the 
institutional preconditions, economic policies and state capacities that are needed to 
achieve this transformation. The earlier debates about the definition of capitalism, the 
key features that made it the significantly more dynamic in generating productivity 
growth compared to previous systems, and the preconditions for the transition to 
capitalism, connect in interesting ways with these more recent controversies about the 
conditions of late development.  
 
For non-Marxist neoclassical institutional economists, capitalism is defined by the 
private ownership of assets and market coordination of all activities that are not 
organized within firms (Williamson 1985). But for Marxists, capitalism is much more 
than this: capitalism is a specific relationship between classes of owners and non-
owners of the means of production such that not only do capitalists own the means of 
production, workers are systematically separated from the ownership of these means 
of production and are forced to work for capitalists to survive. Both non-Marxist and 
Marxist definitions of capitalism are trying to capture the key institutional features of 
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the system that can explain the much higher productivity and productivity growth of 
the capitalist system compared to all previous (or in the non-Marxist view, all 
alternative) systems. An important problem for the neoclassical definition of 
capitalism is that many pre-capitalist systems also had extensive private property 
ownership as well as extensive markets. Here, the Marxist definition does identify 
something distinctive about the new capitalist system that began to emerge in England 
from the sixteenth century onwards, because the separation of working people from 
the means of production was something new.  
 
Another merit of the Marxist approach to capitalism is that while Williamson and the 
new institutional economics can explain why any private property system can be 
efficient in terms of reducing transaction costs, the Marxist definition aims to explain 
why successful capitalist economies enjoyed historically unprecedented rates of 
productivity growth. The neoclassical definition of capitalism derives from the 
analytical argument that well-defined private property rights reduce transaction costs 
and allow markets to reach their full efficiency potential. The Marxist definition 
focuses instead on capitalism as a system of compulsion. Thus, Wood (2002) argues 
that capitalism is characterized not just by the presence of market opportunities, 
which have always been present in societies with markets, but also by a hitherto 
unknown introduction of market compulsions, which ensured that both capitalists and 
workers continuously had to strive to improve their performance just in order to 
survive.  
 
The distinction between these two views is relevant for understanding the limitations 
of the dominant view in contemporary economics that the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for constructing dynamic economies in developing countries is to create 
the conditions for markets to work well. This perspective has venerable precedents 
going back long before its current neoclassical incarnation. It is supported by part of 
the classical economic tradition going back to Adam Smith. Some versions of the 
Marxist argument, while they strongly distinguish capitalism from the market as such, 
nevertheless also appear to support the claim that removing restrictions on markets 
was the critical feature of the transition to capitalism.  
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On the other hand, there are powerful challenges to these views coming from within 
Marxism, including from some of the most interesting work done by Marx himself. 
These arguments point out that not only was capitalism a fundamentally different 
system of property rights and class relationships, its dynamism has to be understood 
as being brought about by a change in the market logic to one of market compulsion 
rather than an extension of the pre-existing role of the market as a provider of profit 
opportunities. This points out the importance of institutional and property right 
changes that were required for the emergence of this compulsion in what we know as 
early capitalism. If these changes are not equivalent to market-enhancing reforms, 
then identifying what they are, and the class and political constraints preventing their 
emergence, is likely to be of paramount importance.  
 
Doing this, however, does not necessarily tell us much about conditions for capitalist 
transformations in contemporary developing countries. There are important 
differences between early capitalism and late capitalism. The historical evidence of 
late development coming mostly from East Asia over the last four decades suggests 
that there are important institutional differences between early and late developers, 
particularly in a much bigger role of the state in providing part of the compulsion for 
productivity growth in late developers. Why was the system of compulsion that was 
sufficient to drive productivity growth in the early developers apparently inadequate 
for late developers? If there are indeed significant differences between early and late 
developers, the capitalist transformation raises yet another question that we have to 
answer. First, we have to decide whether the market-enhancing view of capitalism is 
appropriate, or whether the distinctive feature of capitalism is a set of institutional, 
property right and class relationships that create capitalists and workers and compel 
rapid productivity growth. Secondly, if capitalism is a productive system that is more 
than just a market economy, we have the equally important challenge of explaining 
why the property rights and institutional structures that have been necessary for 
compelling productivity growth in late capitalism may be different from those in early 
capitalism, and identifying what these differences may be.  
 
These issues are critically important regardless of whether or not we believe that a 
capitalist transformation would be in the interest of poorly performing developing 
countries. There is a strong position within Marxism that has argued that meaningful 
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socialism cannot be constructed in poor countries that have not gone through a period 
of capitalist growth. But even if we believe a non-capitalist path to development is 
possible and desirable in poor countries, very similar questions arise about identifying 
the institutional and property right structures that can accelerate productivity growth 
in this non-capitalist or socialist economy, as well as the process of transformation 
through which these rights can come about. The worst situation is arguably one where 
the conventional wisdom about how to create “market economies” in developing 
countries persists despite having produced remarkably poor results in the countries 
most in need of transformation.  
 
We will look first at the debate between the claim that removing restrictions on the 
market created capitalism and the claim that the emergence of capitalism was a social 
transformation involving fundamental changes in property rights and class 
relationships. Secondly, we will look at the reasons why late development may 
require significantly different institutions and rights from early capitalist 
development. We then conclude by examining the implications for current debates 
within development economics about reforms to accelerate development in 
developing countries.  
 
The conditions determining the transition to capitalism in Western Europe have been 
debated for a long time, going back to debates amongst historians, both Marxist and 
non-Marxist. This is an important question because capitalism as a new and radically 
more dynamic economic system first emerged in England, and then in some other 
parts of Western Europe. Yet, for a long time, these areas had been relatively 
technologically and commercially backward compared to other parts of Europe such 
as Florence or the Dutch Republic, and indeed compared to many areas in Asia and 
the Middle East. Two sorts of explanations have been put forward, and the divide 
between them is still relevant for understanding contemporary debates on the 
determinants of and obstacles to the transition to high-productivity economies in 
developing countries today.  
 
The first type of explanation argued that capitalism emerged through the freeing up of 
further market opportunities. According to this position, the transitions to capitalism 
happened in those countries where the obstacles to the market were first removed. 
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These obstacles included political obstacles set up by feudalism, which included many 
barriers to the movement of labour and capital, and barriers that prevented land being 
freely sold. Other obstacles to the market were ideological or religious barriers that 
prevented markets from becoming the main regulator of resource allocation in society. 
This position then argued that these obstacles were first overcome in England and 
then in other parts of Western Europe because changes in internal and external factors 
weakened feudal restrictions and ideologies and allowed the market to grow. The 
group of historians and economists making this case often differed on the obstacles 
they thought were more important and the mechanisms through which they were 
overcome, but they agreed that capitalism emerged because of the removal of 
obstacles to the market. Despite many important differences between them on other 
critical issues, Marxist historians such as Maurice Dobb (1946) and Paul Sweezy 
(1950) shared the view that the distinctive feature of capitalism was that it removed 
many of the fetters that had constrained the market economy under feudalism.  
 
This strand of Marxist thinking argued that in the absence of specific constraints, 
there were powerful forces operating in the form of technical progress, accumulation 
and profit-seeking activities in the pre-capitalist market economy that created 
systemic pressures towards capitalist production. The difference between Dobb and 
Sweezy in this debate was about the process that weakened feudalism and reduced its 
ability to restrict the market so that capitalism could emerge. For Dobb, the process 
that began to remove obstacles to the market was a class struggle between lords and 
peasants internal to the feudal economy. This weakened the political ability of 
feudalism to restrict markets, and allowed the growth of petty commodity production, 
that in turn grew into capitalism. Sweezy’s debate with Dobb was essentially about 
whether these internal forces were sufficient to dissolve feudal fetters.  
 
Sweezy was not convinced, and argued that the growth of long-distance trade played a 
key role in weakening feudalism and allowing capitalism to grow. For Sweezy, the 
removal of fetters constraining the growth of internal markets depended on the 
incorporation of the feudal society into systems of external markets. Thus, for 
Sweezy, not only is capitalism the removal of fetters in the internal market, but 
moreover, the removal of these internal fetters is assisted by the growth of long-
distance trade, which created a market logic that the political power of feudalism 
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could not constrain. The growth of long-distance trade in turn weakened the ability of 
feudalism to restrict internal markets.  
 
The Dobb-Sweezy debate was very sophisticated and had many aspects (for a fuller 
discussion see Hilton 1976) but it did not address some critical questions. If Dobb was 
right, why did class struggles of different types in other pre-capitalist societies not 
weaken internal restraints within those societies sufficient for petty commodity 
production to expand to the point that modern capitalism began to emerge? After all, 
feudalism was quite weak in many parts of the world that were fairly commercialized, 
including non-European areas like India, but capitalism did not emerge there. On the 
other hand, if Sweezy was right, why did commercialization and long distance trade 
not act as a solvent that allowed capitalism to emerge in other trading areas, including 
China, India, the Italian city-states like Florence or the Dutch Republic?  
 
Without many of the subtleties of this early debate within Marxism, the modern 
neoclassical position is similar only in that it also believes that economic takeoff in 
developing countries also depends on removing or at least reducing restrictions on 
markets. From a very different analytical perspective, non-Marxist economic 
historians such as Douglass North (1990) argued that capitalism emerged in Western 
Europe through changes in property rights that allowed the market economy to work 
more efficiently. They conclude that if obstacles to the operation of markets can be 
removed, productivity growth and rising living standards will follow. In earlier 
versions of the neoclassical position, the emphasis was simply on liberalization of 
markets and the reduction of state restrictions.  
 
More recently, the neoclassical position has been enriched by inputs from the New 
Institutional Economics that has argued that for markets to work efficiently, 
transaction costs in the market also have to be reduced, and this requires a number of 
institutional changes. This has added a number of other requirements for the takeoff to 
take place, including the stabilization of property rights, which requires lowering 
expropriation risk and reducing corruption (North 1990). It has also suggested the 
necessity of democratization, to reduce the ability of states to engage in ex post 
expropriation (Olson 1997, 2000).  
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All these reforms are essentially motivated by the desire to make markets work better. 
Implicitly, the neoclassical position argues that the main difference between advanced 
capitalist countries and poorly performing developing ones is that markets do not 
work effectively in the latter. If restrictions on the proper working of markets could be 
removed, these countries too would rapidly begin to resemble advanced capitalist 
countries. In other words, they would in fact become capitalist.  
 
In contrast to these positions, the conventional Marxist position has been not only to 
distinguish the market from capitalism, but also to point out that removing market 
restrictions was not sufficient for this transition. (Later we will discuss a number of 
reasons why removing restrictions on the market may not even be necessary for the 
transition to capitalism.) After all, markets had existed for thousands of years without 
leading to capitalism. Moreover, areas that were relatively more commercialized, such 
as Florence or the Dutch Republic did not make the first transitions to capitalism. Nor 
was there any sign of capitalism in India or China despite the presence of widespread 
long-distance trade within these empires and between them and the rest of the world. 
Since differences in the degree of marketization did not correlate with the degree of 
capitalist development in the pre-capitalist era, it is more consistent to argue that 
capitalism was not just about extending market opportunities, but rather about the 
imposition of a completely new structure of property rights and institutions that 
introduced radically new compulsions for productivity growth.  
 
Marx pointed out that capitalism was indeed a unique system of property rights where 
for the first time, the market operated in such a way that productivity was rapidly 
enhanced and technological progress happened in a sustained manner. The reason was 
the property rights and class relationships of capitalism were such that both capitalists 
and workers were continuously compelled to improve their productivity simply in 
order to survive. This market compulsion had never existed before, and was a sharp 
break from the role of the market in earlier socie ties, where the market provided 
opportunities for greater profit. Robert Brenner (1976, 1985) and Ellen Meiksins 
Wood (2002) have powerfully represented this position, and it can be argued that this 
was much closer to the position of Marx himself in his detailed analysis of how class 
structures changed in the run-up to the capitalist transformation, including through 
processes of primitive accumulation.  
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The transition to these specific structures happened largely through political and 
social processes rather than through extensions of the market. The internal 
configuration of class and state power was most conducive for this transformation in 
England, and this is why the transition to capitalism first happened in English 
agriculture. The processes through which this happened included the forced transfer 
of land to an emerging class of agrarian capitalists that was essential for the creation 
of capitalism in England. Market opportunities were important, and indeed, the new 
large landlords needed to have markets to sell their products, but the presence of 
markets alone did not lead to similar transitions in other countries where the class 
configuration between landlords, tenant farmers and the state was different (Brenner 
1976, 1985).  
 
This analysis says that the reason why capitalism emerged in England did indeed have 
a lot to do with internal class struggles and state strategies (as Dobb had suggested). 
But these struggles were important not because they led to the weakening of feudal 
restrictions on the market, but rather because they led directly to changes in property 
rights and class relationships that were necessary for a capitalist economy to emerge. 
The historical evidence can be read as being strongly in favour of this second 
interpretation of the conditions under which capitalism emerged in the West (Brenner 
1976, 1985; Wood 2002).  
 
If this view is correct, it has enormous significance for current debates on the 
institutional conditions for rapid productivity growth in developing countries. 
Dynamic capitalist economies are unlikely to emerge simply by removing obstacles to 
the market and trying to make their markets more efficient. Rather, we have to 
identify the rights and institutions that are necessary for rapid productivity growth in 
the context of the contemporary world economy and we need to identify how these 
can be introduced in different contexts. This perspective suggests that the construction 
of capitalist societies in developing countries where capitalism is not fully developed 
may require a social transformation, and this may in turn require, or be held up by, 
specific balances of power between internal classes and the state (Khan 2002). 
Moreover, this social transformation may involve substantial internal conflicts 
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between different sections of existing propertied classes as property rights and class 
relationships are altered.  
 
The huge social transition from pre-capitalist or largely pre-capitalist societies, where 
markets created opportunities but not an overriding set of social compulsions, to 
capitalist societies where markets operated to compel the maximization of profit and 
continuous productivity growth was described by Polanyi (1957) as the great 
transformation. However, Polanyi, like Dobb, argues that the transition was driven 
largely by technological developments within pre-capitalist society, which 
necessitated the development of large-scale production. This, combined with the 
weakness of internal constraints within feudalism in Western Europe, allowed the 
great transformation to happen in Europe.  
 
If we ignore, for a moment, the debate over the process through which capitalism is 
set up, Polanyi makes the important observation that once capitalism has emerged, the 
retention of some market restrictions can be necessary for political purposes, to make 
capitalism politically palatable. If markets became completely unfettered, society may 
disintegrate, given the very powerful forces of social dissolution set in train by the 
capitalist market logic. This was the first time that the political necessity of states 
mediating capitalist markets and easing some of the pain of continuous market 
restructuring was pointed out. Polanyi’s argument suggests that once capitalism has 
been set up, fully unrestricted markets may be damaging for capitalism, and may 
indeed result in its political collapse. Thus, some degree of market restriction may 
paradoxically be politically necessary for the survival of capitalism.  
 
A more powerful set of reasons why some specific types of market restrictions may be 
necessary for capitalism emerges when we look at late capitalism. In early developers, 
the creation of a propertyless class of workers and a class of asset owners who were 
competing amongst themselves to survive was sufficient to ensure relatively rapid 
productivity growth through market competition. It is not clear that a similar structure 
of rights in contemporary developing countries would have the same effect, given that 
now developing countries have to catch up with advanced countries that already have  
higher productivity and better technologies than they do. A catching-up country that 
had free trade would very likely be stuck with low-technology production.  
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In theory, if a market exists, and a country has cheaper labour than its competitors do, 
capital should flow to the cheap labour country. But this theory ignores that 
competitiveness and productivity are only high in some countries because their social 
structures impose compulsions for high productivity. If productivity is low and does 
not grow, low wages by themselves will not attract investment. This is simply a 
matter of arithmetic. Even if wages in the developing country are 1/20th that in an 
advanced country, if productivity is 1/40th, unit labour costs will be twice as high in 
the developing country.  
 
Productivity differentials between advanced and developing countries are likely to be 
particularly high in high technology industries, and less so in low technology 
industries. Given the wage differential, this would make it profitable for capitalist 
owners to shift the location of some low-technology industries to developing 
countries, but not necessarily shift high-technology industries. This, rather than the 
relative cost of labour and capital is a more powerful explanation of why only low-
productivity industries are likely to migrate to developing countries that rely simply 
on markets, with no internal strategy of social transformation. But now we are 
referring to a social transformation towards property right, institutional and class 
structures that can enforce productivity growth in a context of catching up. 
 
The developmental state literature (Aoki, Kim and Okuno-Fujiwara 1997, Woo-
Cumings 1999 and many others) and case studies of catching-up countries such as 
South Korea (Amsden 1989) and Ta iwan (Wade 1990) show that successful catching 
up has required a range of institutions and interventions that are quite different from 
classical capitalism. It is important to understand in outline why this might be so.  
 
A critical problem with setting up high-productivity industries in developing countries 
is that learning how to use sophisticated processes, and setting up the internal and 
external systems that are required to achieve the potential productivity of high-
technology industries takes time. This very simple point was made a long time ago by 
Kenneth Arrow who introduced the term “learning-by-doing” to describe the fact that 
productivity was always initially low when workers (and managers) have to work 
with new machines, and only gradually improved as workers learned how to use 
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them. This means that unless there is some institutional system that can both allow 
this learning to take place, and ensure that resources are not wasted if learning fails, 
successful investment in high productivity sectors is unlikely to happen.  
 
The conventional answer to this in developing countries has been to support infant 
industries through conditional subsidization policies. But conditional subsidization 
requires not just appropriate intentions on the part of the state, but also, and critically, 
it requires a power structure that allows the state to withdraw support when 
performance is poor, and indeed to restructure and re-allocate assets rapidly when 
required (Khan 2000a). Thus in late developers, the social transformation does not 
just have to create a working class with the imperative to work, and a capitalist class 
that owns property. There also has to be a distribution of power between state and 
capital that allows different strategies of catching up to be organized and 
implemented, because market competition between capitalists will no longer suffice 
to ensure rapid productivity growth. In short, specific systems of state- led compulsion 
are required to complement market compulsion in late developers. 
 
This approach can help to explain why different systems of state support of 
technology acquisition played a key role in late developers. Although outright infant 
industry subsidization was not always used, in all successful late developers, the state 
evolved some system of carrots and sticks to attract high technology industries while 
retaining the ability to withdraw this support or otherwise sanction non-performers if 
performance in bringing in high productivity technologies was poor. Not all late 
developer states were equally good in achieving these goals, but they were all 
substantially successful and this explains their relative success compared to the vast 
majority of developing countries that performed rather poorly. Because very different 
institutional and property right structures can be used to create incentives and 
compulsions for technical progress, the internal power structures that are required to 
implement and police these strategies have differed quite significantly. This means 
that the internal power structures and class conflicts that may allow a viable capitalist 
economy to emerge are not very narrowly defined, and more variants of capitalist 
transition may emerge in the future. On the other hand, this does not mean that every 
developing country has an internal power structure that is suitable for the rapid 
implementation of new institutional and property right structures that would be 
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appropriate for capitalist catching-up strategies. In many poorly performing 
developing countries, there may indeed be internal conflicts that are blocking social 
transformation to economies that are more productive (Khan 2002). 
 
This analysis helps us to evaluate the mainstream consensus that a perfectly working 
market is capitalism, and that bringing about the conditions for a well-working and 
efficient market is creating the conditions for a capitalist transition. What is required 
(in the conventional wisdom) for such a market-driven transition?  
 
First, we require stable property rights, defined by low expropriation risk. Note that 
we do not require any specific structure of property rights, all we need is that all 
existing rights should be well defined and non-expropriable. It does not matter if 
existing rights are peasant rights over land or the land rights of large unproductive 
landlords, or anything else. The assumption is that as soon as we have property rights 
with low expropriation risk, transaction costs will fall, and efficient allocations will 
follow. The point made by Brenner and Wood that markets did not lead to capitalism 
emerging for thousands of years till forced changes in rights created capitalism in 
England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has to be answered by these 
theorists.  
 
Second, it is argued that well-working markets require no intervention by states, so a 
well-working capitalism requires the virtual absence of state intervention. Intervention 
creates rents (incomes above opportunity incomes) and this impedes the operation of 
competitive markets. This claim contradicts the role of the state as an agency of social 
classes pushing the social transformation that creates versions of capitalism. It also 
ignores the role of the state in managing the politics of capitalism, in the way Polanyi 
pointed out.  
 
Third, the mainstream view argues tha t well-working markets require the absence of 
rent seeking and corruption since these processes create rents and destabilize property 
rights. So, it is argued that creating the conditions necessary for a takeoff involves 
fighting corruption and rent seeking as well.  
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Finally, it is assumed that since rent seeking benefits a minority, the majority will use 
democracy to ensure that rent seeking does not happen. The majority will also ensure 
that the state does not expropriate resources from investors ex post. Therefore, it is 
argued, we need to have democracy to make a market economy work. These reforms 
add up to the so-called good governance agenda, which is now recognized as a set of 
preconditions for market- led (capitalist) growth.  
 
But what is the evidence that good governance was necessary for generating 
economic dynamism in any developing country? While a lot of cross-sectional 
evidence is presented in support of the conventional models, the regression exercises 
do not actually support the claims that are made (see Khan 2002 for a critique). Figure 
1 plots Knack and Keefer's Property Right Stability Index (incorporating corruption, 
rule of law, bureaucratic quality, government contract repudiation and expropriation 
risk) for 1984, the earliest available year, against GDP growth rates for the decade 
1980-90. We can treat 1984 as the index for the beginning of the period in question. 
The interesting observation is that while the regression line has the positive slope 
expected by the mainstream approach to development, (although the statistical fit is 
very poor), the countries in our sample separate into three quite separate groups. Most 
countries belong to either group 1 (low-growth developing countries, defined by a 
growth rate below the advanced country average) or group 3 (advanced industrialized 
countries, defined by their high per capita incomes).  
 
The first group has low growth (by definition) and poor governance characteristics, 
while the second has higher growth and the best governance characteristics. The 
(weak) slope of the regression line depends on most countries being in one or other of 
these two groups. But the most interesting group is group 2 (developing countries that 
are catching-up by virtue of having higher growth rates than the advanced countries). 
This group is interesting because though the countries in it are not numerous enough 
to make a difference to the slope of the regression line, they were the only ones that 
were actually catching up. A visual examination of the data shows that while their 
growth was significant, their property right and other governance characteristics were 
not significantly different from the developing country average.  
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Figure 1 The Relationship between Stable Property Rights and Growth 
 
This evidence raises a very important question for catching-up policies in developing 
countries. Do group 1 countries try to reach group 3 by first emulating the market and 
governance characteristics of group 3 countries, or do they look at history and  try to 
attain the governance characteristics of group 2 countries, as these are the only 
countries that are actually catching up? The route to group 3 may be through group 2, 
in which case, the required institutional, market and class characteristics of group 1 
countries should be sought in group 2 rather than group 3. The first route can be 
described as the attempt to create capitalism through creating the conditions for 
efficient markets. The second route is the route of constructing a capitalist 
transformation, which in late developers involves not just the transformation of 
property rights to create a capitalist and a working class, but also the development of 
different types of state capacities to push technological progress through systems of 
conditional incentives and compulsion.  
 
The debate on how the capitalist transformation of poorly performing developing 
countries is to be organized has acquired very significant implications. The 
marketization strategy, with its focus on stable property rights and the creation of a 
well-working market is clearly the dominant strategy. But while stable property rights 
and well-working markets are important characteristics of an advanced capitalist 
economy, creating a capitalist economy always requires substantial restructuring of 
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pre-existing property rights and incentives for emerging capitalists to acquire new 
technologies as rapidly as possible. During this transition, the condition of stable 
property rights is therefore an odd one to aim for; particularly since the existing 
structure of rights and production systems are by definition generating low 
productivity and productivity growth. The real question is whether we can ensure that 
the economic and social restructuring that is taking place in every developing country 
is taking the country in the direction of a viable capitalist economy or not. The danger 
is that the good governance approach allows us to bypass difficult questions about the 
social transformation and instead focus on reforms that would at best work if the aim 
were to make an already existing capitalist market economy work better. This 
assumes that a capitalist market economy exists in the first place; when in most 
developing countries the problem is to organize the capitalist transformation itself. 
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